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A B S T R A C T
Global average sea levels are expected to rise by up to a metre by the end of the century. This long-term
rise will combine with shorter-term changes in sea level (e.g. high tides, storm surges) to increase risks of
ﬂooding and erosion in vulnerable coastal areas. As communities become increasingly exposed to these
risks, understanding their beliefs and responses becomes more important. While studies have explored
public responses to climate change, less research has focused on perceptions of the speciﬁc risks
associated with sea-level change. This paper presents the results of a mental models study that
addressed this knowledge gap by exploring expert and public perceptions of sea-level change on the
Severn Estuary, a threatened coastal environment in the southwest of the United Kingdom. A model was
developed from the literature and expert interviews (N = 11), and compared with public perceptions
elicited via interviews (N = 20) and a quantitative survey (N = 359). Whilst we ﬁnd a high degree of
consistency between expert and public understandings, there are important differences that have
implications for how sea level risks are interpreted and for what are perceived as appropriate mitigation
and adaptation practices. We also ﬁnd a number of potential barriers to engaging with the issue:
individuals express low concern about sea-level change in relation to other matters; they feel detached
from the issue, seeing it as something that will happen in future to other people; and many perceive that
neither the causes of nor responses to sea-level change are their responsibility. We point to areas upon
which future risk communications should therefore concentrate.
 2015 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND
license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
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Global mean sea level rose during the 20th century and is
continuing to do so (Church et al., 2013). As the world warms, sea-
level rise is inevitable (Nicholls et al., 2011) largely through
thermal expansion (increased water volume due to temperature
rise) and glacio-eustasy (increased water volume due to additions
from melting land-ice). By 2100, global average sea levels are
expected to rise by between 0.26 m and 0.98 m, relative to the
1986–2005 baseline (IPCC, 2013). Sea levels also change on shorter
timescales, for example due to storm surges and high tides. It is the
combination of mean sea levels and shorter term ﬂuctuations that
cause the most extreme water levels at the coast; mean sea-level
rise raises the baseline level of the water, meaning high tides,* Corresponding author at: School of Psychology, Park Place, Cardiff University,
Wales CF10 3AT, UK. Tel.: +44 029 2087 6520.
E-mail address: ThomasMJ6@Cardiff.ac.uk (M. Thomas).
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.gloenvcha.2015.04.009
0959-3780/ 2015 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access articl
4.0/).storm surges and waves reach higher. The impacts of these
extreme sea levels include ﬂooding, erosion and intrusion into
freshwater resources (Wong et al., 2014).
As coastal communities become increasingly exposed to these
risks, understanding their beliefs and responses becomes more
important. Ignoring lay perspectives is incompatible with demo-
cratic ideals, and lay participation can increase legitimacy and
improve conﬁdence in risk institutions (Fiorino, 1990). Some
aspects of lay risk judgments are as sound (or more so) than expert
risk judgments, and local knowledge can add a valuable layer to
risk understandings (Fiorino, 1990; Irwin and Wynne, 1996; Lebel,
2013; Santha et al., 2014). Furthermore, without feedback from the
target audience, scientists do not know how their well-intended
communications are received and understood by the public: this
‘strategic listening’ (Pidgeon and Fischhoff, 2011, 38) is the
purpose of this study.
While a growing body of research has explored public
perceptions of climate change (for overviews, see Wolf and Moser,
2011; Lorenzoni and Whitmarsh, 2014), and to a lesser extente under the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/
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2012), little research has explored perceptions of sea-level change
(SLC) as a wider issue. This is interesting in view of the
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change favouring the terms
‘sea-level change’ and ‘changes in sea level’ since the Second
Assessment Report (IPCC, 1996, 2001, 2013), and the role of
shorter-term change in causing extreme sea levels. The other
reason for using the term ‘sea-level change’ in this study is that
solely engaging participants with the term ‘sea-level rise’ may
preclude them from expressing a view that sea levels might fall; a
perception highly relevant for risk communicators.
A complex, multifaceted issue, we expect that many of the
ﬁndings regarding SLC perceptions will resonate with climate
change perceptions more broadly. This is because (a) the issues are
intrinsically linked: climate change causes sea-level rise, and (b)
both issues contain elements that are difﬁcult to detect without
close measurement, act over long timescales and are uncertain. As
complex issues, people are likely to respond to both with
uncertain, conditional and partially-formed views contingent on
factors such as trust and social identity (e.g. Pidgeon et al., 1992;
Wynne, 1992a). A brief review of literature pertaining to climate
change perceptions is therefore useful before reviewing SLC
perceptions in particular.
Studies have explored multiple aspects of climate change
perceptions including knowledge (e.g. Bostrom et al., 1994;
Reynolds et al., 2010), psychological and socio-cultural factors
(e.g. Leiserowitz, 2006), and potential barriers towards engage-
ment (e.g. Lorenzoni et al., 2007; Gifford, 2011). They ﬁnd that
there is variable concern about the issue (Leiserowitz, 2005;
Lorenzoni and Pidgeon, 2006; Capstick et al., 2015), and that it
tends to rank low relative to other concerns, particularly day-to-
day issues like health and economic security (Poortinga and
Pidgeon, 2003a; Zsamboky et al., 2011). This reﬂects a widespread
perception that climate change is remote in space and time (e.g.
Leiserowitz, 2005), and has thus been described as psychologi-
cally distant (Lorenzoni and Pidgeon, 2006; Liberman and Trope,
2008; Wolf and Moser, 2011; Spence et al., 2012). Research has
also shown that individuals contextualise climate change among
broader perspectives. For example, people often believe that the
responsibility for causing and mitigating climate change lies with
others, particularly powerful external parties such as government
and businesses (Poortinga et al., 2006; Spence et al., 2010;
Pidgeon, 2012; Capstick et al., 2013); perhaps in part due to a
perceived lack of ability in taking action and personally making a
difference (Spence et al., 2010; Capstick et al., 2013). This low self-
efﬁcacy can lead individuals to employ a number of strategies to
avoid thinking about climate change, and while it may be
understood and cared about, information may be held at a
distance in order to manage emotions (Norgaard, 2006).
Optimism is another strategy for dealing with unpleasant futures,
and both avoidance and optimism have been cited as potential
barriers towards public engagement (Norgaard, 2006; Lorenzoni
et al., 2007; Gifford, 2011).
As one of the main impacts of climate change, there has been
growing interest in public perceptions of global mean sea-level
rise. Most research has treated it as one of many aspects of climate
change (e.g. Bostrom et al., 1994; Read et al., 1994; Reynolds et al.,
2010), or as one of a number of marine climate change issues
(Chilvers et al., 2014; Gelcich et al., 2014). Others have focussed on
perceptions of particular aspects of sea-level rise, especially
adaptation strategies (Myatt et al., 2003; Alexander et al., 2012;
Barnett et al., 2013) and speciﬁc impacts (Dolan and Walker, 2006;
Zsamboky et al., 2011). A few have undertaken more holistic
studies of sea-level rise perceptions amongst the public (Harvatt
et al., 2011; Evans et al., 2012), or stakeholders (Lonsdale et al.,
2008; Poumade`re et al., 2008; Raaijmakers et al., 2008).Studies have shown that sea-level rise is one of the more
commonly discussed consequences of climate change among the
public, media and policy makers (Rick et al., 2011; Chilvers et al.,
2014). Fully 43% of European respondents feel informed about the
issue (CLAMER, 2011), and respondents in Europe and New
Zealand tend to think that sea levels will rise in future (CLAMER,
2011; Evans et al., 2012). However, research suggests that in
general, the UK public has a low awareness of sea-level rise
(Fernandez-Bilbao, 2012). A common misconception regards the
low importance assigned to thermal expansion (Read et al., 1994;
Reynolds et al., 2010; Tobler et al., 2012). Like climate change, sea-
level rise tends to be associated with negative feelings (Lorenzoni
et al., 2006), and correspondingly, most European respondents
report being concerned about it (CLAMER, 2011), although its
importance is lower than other marine issues such as pollution and
overﬁshing (Gelcich et al., 2014). Furthermore, while European
survey respondents generally perceive marine environmental
problems as happening now or in their lifetime (Gelcich et al.,
2014), there is some evidence that sea-level rise is seen as a distant
risk (Evans et al., 2012). Research also shows that individuals
transfer the responsibility of acting on sea-level rise to others
(Harvatt et al., 2011), but that this is accompanied by low trust in
the agencies perceived to be responsible (Myatt et al., 2003;
Fernandez-Bilbao, 2012).
Regarding other drivers (causes) of SLC, the public understands
that the majority of climate scientists expect an increase in
extreme events such as storms (Tobler et al., 2012), and some
research shows good understanding of short term drivers. For
example, lay people in the Philippines include an increase in the
intensity and frequency of storm events in their perceptions of
climate change (Combest-Friedman et al., 2012), and lay repre-
sentations of stressors on marginal African coasts include storm
surges, waves and high tides (Bunce et al., 2010). Indeed, local
knowledge of such factors has been shown to be important for
forecasting coastal hazards in India (Santha et al., 2014). Other
research however highlights differences between expert and
public perceptions. In the US, the public tend to perceive wind
as being the greater risk from major storms, underestimating the
potential impacts of storm surges (Baker et al., 2012; Morrow and
Nadeau, 2012). Thus, the extent of ﬂooding from storm surges can
come as a surprise (Morss and Hayden, 2010).
While there is an emerging body of literature on public
perceptions of some elements of SLC – particularly mean sea-level
rise – little is known about public mental models of SLC as a
complex risk issue. This study aims to address this gap by (1)
examining expert and public perceptions of SLC, and (2) comparing
the two to identify key areas for future communications. To do this,
we use the mental models approach developed by Morgan et al.
(2002). Previous research into SLC perceptions has tended to rely
heavily on survey approaches (Evans et al., 2012; Ryan et al., 2012),
while some have used interviews (Harvatt et al., 2011; Barnett
et al., 2013; Santha et al., 2014), or surveys prior to deliberative
workshops (Chilvers et al., 2014). None has used a mental models
approach, despite its successful application to other risks including
climate change (Bostrom et al., 1994; Morgan et al., 2002; Cox
et al., 2003; Lowe and Lorenzoni, 2007). The core premise of this
approach is that in order for communications to be effective in
changing behaviour, audiences’ internal representations of reality
(their ‘mental models’) must be key in their development. The
approach used here, developed by Morgan et al. (2002), builds on
earlier work (Maharik and Fischhoff, 1993) to do this systemati-
cally. First, the audience’s mental models are explored using
participant-centred semi-structured interviews that allow indi-
viduals to respond to whichever aspect they feel is most important,
in a way that is meaningful to them. The researcher does not
assume what these perceptions might be, or how they might be
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of the population by means of a survey, before expert and lay
perceptions are compared to identify similarities and differences.
2. Case-study area
The Severn Estuary is a valuable case study for exploring
perceptions of complex SLC risks because it is a diverse,
dynamic environment with multiple stressors and impacts. The
Estuary has the second largest tidal range in the world, with an
average mean spring tidal range of 12.3 m (Langston et al.,
2010), which commonly leads to the formation of a tidal bore
that propagates up the Severn at a height of up to 2 m (Uncles,
2010). The Estuary also drains the UK’s longest river, and at
21,590 km2 has one of the largest catchments in the UK (Severn
Estuary Partnership, 2011). The rivers that ﬂow into the Estuary
supply a vast amount of sediment (Severn Estuary Coastal
Group and ATKINS, 2010a), much of which is deposited as
mudﬂats. These mudﬂats support considerable biodiversity, and
the Estuary contains the largest aggregation of salt marsh
habitat in the south and south-west of the UK (Severn Estuary
Partnership, 2011). Partly due to these features, the Estuary is of
high ecological signiﬁcance (Severn Estuary Coastal Group and
ATKINS, 2010b), and is a designated Special Protection Area,
Special Area of Conservation and Ramsar site.
There is a mixture of urban and rural land uses around the
Estuary, and its shores are home to around one million people
(Severn Estuary Partnership, 2011). It is also the site of signiﬁcant
industrial development including chemical processing, power
stations and ports, which are supported by good transport links,
cooling water and offshore aggregates for construction (IMCORE,
2011). The Estuary is also important for recreation and tourism
(Knowles and Myatt-Bell, 2001) and may in future become a key
source of renewable marine energy, with proposals including a
tidal barrage (House of Commons, 2013) and a series of tidal
lagoons (Emanuel, 2013).
Governance on the Estuary is complex (Dodds, 2010), shared
across two Governments (Westminster and the Welsh Govern-
ment), fourteen Local Authorities and two County Councils.
Accordingly, many different groups are responsible for managing
ﬂood risk: land owners/developers, local planning authorities,
regional planning bodies and government agencies (Department of
Communities and Local Government, 2006). While ﬂood risk on the
Severn Estuary (including ﬂood defences and ﬂood awareness
promotion) is managed mainly by England’s Environment Agency
and Wales’ Natural Resources Wales, Local Authorities are heavily
involved in local Shoreline Management Plans, which are
responsible for drafting coastal management policies. The vast
majority of the Estuary coastline is protected by coastal defences,
some of which date back to Roman times (Sustainable Develop-
ment Commission, 2007). Shoreline management strategies
feature widespread defence maintenance and improvementsExpert model 
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Fig. 1. Methodolog(Severn Estuary Coastal Group and ATKINS, 2010a; Environment
Agency Wales, 2011), although some areas have undergone
managed realignment. This is a controversial policy whereby an
area is allowed to ﬂood through the removal of hard structures in
order to create a soft coastal defence. A beneﬁt is that it creates or
protects intertidal habitats, which are currently under threat on
the Estuary from rising sea levels (Environment Agency, 2011).
Mean sea level on the Severn Estuary has been rising
throughout the current interglacial period (Environment Agency,
2006); a trend that is expected to continue in future (MCCIP, 2010).
The global trend is exacerbated here by isostatic subsidence in
response to the last glacial, which is causing the shoreline to
subside at a rate of around 0.76 mm/year (Shennan and Horton,
2002). With regards to shorter term SLC, the Estuary is particularly
vulnerable to storms because of its low-lying topography, funnel-
shaped coastal conﬁguration, orientation with respect to prevail-
ing winds, and tidal setting, which together enhance surge heights
from storms tracking east and north-eastward (Horsburgh and
Horritt, 2006; Haslett and Bryant, 2007). Historically, these factors
have contributed to a number of severe coastal ﬂooding events,
including a catastrophic event in 1607 that ﬂooded more than
500 km2 and killed more than 2000 people (Bryant and Haslett,
2007). Severe ﬂuvial ﬂood events have also affected the Estuary,
including major ﬂoods in Gloucester in 2007, and recent extensive
ﬂooding on the Somerset Levels in early 2014 (BBC News, 2014).
3. Methods
Our approach followed Morgan et al. (2002), whereby an expert
model is compared with public perceptions elicited by way of
qualitative interviews and a quantitative survey. The use of mixed-
methods approaches like this adds value by combining evidence
from different methodologies (Pidgeon, 2012): while qualitative
interviews can scope viewpoints and provide deep insight into the
contexts of these views, quantitative surveys can elicit perceptions
from a large population and triangulate ﬁndings (Cohen et al.,
2000). Our approach is outlined in Fig. 1, and elaborated in Sections
3.1–3.3 (also see Appendices A and B).
3.1. Developing an expert model of SLC
The ﬁrst stage of the research developed an expert model of SLC
in order to provide a comparison with public perceptions. The
model was developed from a literature review and interviews with
experts (N = 11), carried out in 2011. Interviewees were selected
on the basis of their professional expertise in relation to long- and
short-term sea-level changes, and impacts and responses on the
Severn Estuary (cf. Rice, 2010). They consisted of six academics,
two national government ofﬁcials, one local government ofﬁcial,
one Environment Agency coastal engineer and one marine
environmental consultant.ublic 
ublic (N=20) 
terviews 
sk 
g 
Survey with public 
•Quantitative survey with 
public (N=359), focusing on 
knowledge about and 
responses to sea-level change  
ical approach.
Table 1
Summary of participant demographics.
Demographic Interview
sample
Survey
sample
Severn
Estuary
regiona
Age
18–24 5% 5% 13%
25–34 30% 20% 17%
35–44 5% 18% 17%
45–54 20% 23% 17%
55–64 25% 21% 15%
65–74 15% 10% 11%
75+ 0% 2% 10%
Female 50% 58% 51%
Own their own home
(outright or with mortgage)
85% 61% 68%
Bachelor’s degree/equivalent or higher 60% 38% 29%
a Statistics are from 2011 Census data for complete Local Authorities bordering
the Estuary: Vale of Glamorgan, Cardiff, Newport, Monmouthshire, Forest of Dean,
Gloucestershire, Tewkesbury, Stroud, South Gloucestershire, City of Bristol, North
Somerset, West Somerset and Sedgemoor (Ofﬁce for National Statistics, 2011
Census).
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a cognitive mapping task and a probability elicitation. The semi-
structured interview was designed to scope the risks of SLC on the
Estuary, and to ﬁnd out as much about these risks as possible, while
the creation of a cognitive map (cf. Kearney and Kaplan, 1997)
explored relationships between themes and acted as a prompt for
further discussion. The subjective probability exercise (e.g.
Spetzler and Stael Von Holstein, 1975) elicited SLC probabilities
for the Estuary, and is reported in Thomas et al. (in press). The
format of the expert model was inspired by decision theory (e.g.
Miller et al., 1976) and previous mental model studies (Morgan
et al., 2002, Lowe and Lorenzoni, 2007), while the conceptual
framework was inﬂuenced by the cognitive maps created by
experts, and various literature resources (particularly Nicholls,
2010). To build the model, interview transcripts were coded using
a structured approach based on central themes in the literature
(Hansson and Bryngelsson, 2009), with other themes coded as they
emerged. The codes were then sub-categorised to form the basis of
a hierarchy, which was iteratively developed into a map structure.
To enable respondent validation (Henwood and Pidgeon, 1992),
participating experts were sent a copy of the model and invited to
comment.
3.2. Qualitative interviews with public participants
Interview sessions were carried out in 2012 with a diverse
sample of 20 members of the public living around the Severn
Estuary (Fig. 2). A sample of this size is deemed sufﬁcient for
mental models interviews in order to reveal most of the common
beliefs held by the population (Morgan et al., 2002; Bruine de Bruin
and Bostrom, 2013), and the saturation of major themes appeared
to have been reached by the twentieth interview. Recruitment was
topic-blind, with participants informed only that the interview
was about ‘change on the Severn Estuary’ prior to the session
commencing. A purposive sampling technique was employed,
whereby acquaintances (‘gatekeepers’) who lived in target areasFig. 2. Approximate location of interview participants around the Severn Estuary, in the
pseudonyms.  Crown Copyright and Database Right 2014. Ordnance Survey (Digimapwere asked to pass the lead researcher’s contact details to people
who might be willing to participate (see Warren, 2001).
Participants were offered an honorarium of £10. The approximate
locations of respondents and their demographic characteristics are
shown in Fig. 2 and Table 1. Compared with the Severn Estuary
region, the sample was underrepresented by 18–24 year olds and
35–44 year olds, and was over represented by home owners and
those with higher qualiﬁcations (Ofﬁce for National Statistics, 2011
Census).
The purpose of the interview sessions was to explore what
people already perceive regarding SLC on the Severn Estuary, and
therefore provided participants with minimal new information
and gave them plenty of scope to talk about everything they
considered relevant. Sessions lasted around 90 min, and were in south west of the United Kingdom. Gender (M/F) and age are indicated alongside
 Licence)
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open-ended questions designed to elicit as much information as
possible without leading the participant. During this session,
participants were asked to talk about what comes to mind about
the Severn Estuary, before being asked about the main issues they
feel face the Estuary now and in the future. At this point,
participants were told that the study was about SLC, and asked to
‘talk about sea-level change’. In practice, this was a question that
all participants were able to engage with, and elicited top-of-mind
thoughts on the topic before each was followed up in more detail
(Morgan et al., 2002). The interview then became more directed by
prompting participants about major parts of the expert model:
processes, historical and future changes, impacts, adaptation and
mitigation, and ‘the bigger picture’ (How do you feel about the
issues? How important are they?). Detailed aspects of each theme
were only discussed if the participant raised them. The semi-
structured interview was followed by a picture sorting task,
designed to prompt discussion on topics that did not arise during
the semi-structured interview (Morgan et al., 2002). This involved
participants sorting a pile of images into those that were related to
SLC and those that were not, explaining their reasoning for each
decision. The ﬁnal stage was a cognitive mapping task (adapted
from Kearney and Kaplan, 1997) to further prompt discussion and
explore how participants grouped and linked ideas. Interview
sessions were audio recorded and transcribed.
The traditional mental models approach tends to focus on what
people know about a risk (Bostrom et al., 1994; Read et al., 1994;
Morgan et al., 2002). This has been criticised because personal
engagement may be determined by factors in addition to
knowledge (Baumann and Sims, 1978; Irwin and Wynne, 1996;
Lorenzoni et al., 2007; Kahan et al., 2012), including how people
feel about a risk (Slovic et al., 2004), their values (Kahan et al.,
2011), and wider social context (Darier and Schu¨le, 1999; Bulkeley,
2000; Pidgeon et al., 2003). Therefore, we expanded the traditional
approach to also investigate some of these other issues (cf. Cox
et al., 2003, 2005). To this end, coding proceeded in two stages.
First, a content analysis was carried out to investigate the presence
or absence of the themes in the expert model, noting whether each
was mentioned before or after prompting. Second, transcripts were
analysed using a grounded approach (Glaser and Strauss, 1967;
Henwood and Pidgeon, 1992), whereby concepts ‘emerged’ from
the interviews, and codes were developed to ﬁt the data. Themes
that emerged during the qualitative analyses were followed up in
the quantitative survey.
3.3. Quantitative public survey
The quantitative survey (N = 359) was carried out in March
2013 to explore perceptions amongst a broadly representative
sample of people living within ten miles of the Estuary shoreline.
An online protocol was used, and participants were recruited using
a specialist participant recruitment agency, incentivised by the
agency’s own loyalty points. All responses were anonymous and
recruitment was topic blind, with participants knowing only that
the survey was about ‘the Severn Estuary and the changes that
happen there’ before commencing. The demographic proﬁle of
participants is shown in Table 1. Compared with the Severn
Estuary region, the sample was overrepresented by females and
people with higher qualiﬁcation levels, and underrepresented by
the oldest and youngest groups and home owners.
Survey content was informed by the results of the expert and
public interview phases. After consenting to take part, participants
viewed a map of the Estuary and surrounding area, and then
answered 35 questions relating to their understanding of and
responses to SLC. The ﬁrst question asked participants to tick up to
ﬁve of 13 things that they think are main issues of concern aroundthe Severn Estuary today and for the next 20 years. The list was
drawn from concerns expressed during the interviews and
included SLC, ﬂooding, risks of nuclear accident, and a decline in
traditional industries and crafts. Participants were then asked
about rates of future SLC, measured with sliders representing sea-
level rise and fall (signiﬁcant, moderate, slight or no change). They
were asked to state what level of risk or beneﬁt sea-level rise and
sea-level fall would pose to the Estuary, before stating how
concerned they were about SLC. The next question asked whether
11 statements about the causes of long and short-term SLC were
true or false (see Read et al., 1994; Cox et al., 2005; Reynolds et al.,
2010); ﬁve that were consistent with the expert model and ﬁve
that were inconsistent.
At this point in the survey, participants were presented with a
short description of what causes sea levels to change on short and
long timescales, and estimates of mean sea-level rise on the
Estuary by the year 2100. This description was designed to provide
participants with enough information to be able to complete the
rest of the survey, and to clarify the meaning of the term ‘sea-level
change’. The next two questions presented statements about the
physical and social impacts of sea-level rise on the Estuary, and
asked participants to indicate whether they were true or false.
Next, they were asked to tick any of 17 potential impacts that
would personally concern them, including physical and socio-
economic impacts. They were then asked to select measures that
they thought would be most effective in limiting the amount of
sea-level rise on the Severn Estuary, and another question asked
which would be most effective in reducing the impacts.
Participants then stated their level of agreement with a number
of bipolar statements relating to their opinions on who/where/
when SLC would impact, whether they think about SLC a lot, whose
responsibility it is to respond, whether they feel personally able to
do anything about causes/impacts, whether they trust the
government/Environment Agency to protect residents from ﬂood-
ing, and whether they are informed about SLC.
4. Findings
4.1. Expert perceptions
The full expert model is highly complex, consisting of more than
100 themes (Thomas, 2013). A summary is shown in Fig. 3. The
model consists of drivers of extreme sea levels, which can lead to
physical and socio-economic impacts such as ﬂooding and damage
to homes and property. These impacts are moderated by factors
that affect vulnerability, including mitigation and adaptation
measures. The full model contains a number of uncertainties. Some
are due to gaps in knowledge that can in theory be reduced by
further research (epistemic uncertainties), while others are a
function of factors such as random variability that cannot be
reduced by further research (aleatory uncertainties). They include
uncertainty over whether storms will worsen in future, how the
Greenland and West Antarctic Ice Sheets will respond to warming,
and the rate and extent of future climate change. A key uncertainty
regards the magnitudes of future SLC (see Thomas et al., in press).
Whilst we recognise that factors in addition to knowledge affect
expert risk judgements (e.g. Tversky and Kahneman, 1974; Wynne,
1992b), we do not address these in this paper. Experts
concentrated primarily on processes and impacts, and expressed
their own feelings and concerns much less than public participants
did. We expect that this was largely due to the focus of the expert
interview protocol, and also perhaps because they did not see it as
their role to express such viewpoints. For public participants on the
other hand, such factors played a large role in their conceptualisa-
tions of SLC (see Section 4.2).
Drivers and projections of SLC 
Drivers are climatic and non-climatic factors that combine to determine 
the frequency and magnitude of extreme levels. They include long term 
trends and short term sea-level changes.  
Long term drivers include: 
• Glacio-eustacy - global changes in sea level caused by variations in the 
amount of water held in the cryosphere, e.g. due to climate change. 
• Thermal expansion - increased water volume due to temperature rise. 
• Isostatic subsidence - decreased land elevation in response to the last 
glacial.
Short term drivers include: 
• Tides - the Severn Estuary has a very la rge average mean tidal range of 
6.5m at neaps and 12.3m on springs.  
• Storms –  While sea-level rise drives longer term trends, storms are the 
main driver of change on a short timescale.  
Projections of future sea-level rise 
Sea-level rise is occurring on the Estuary and is expected to continue. 
There is wide variation in judgements: participating experts ’ median 
estimates range from 20cm to 100cm for the year 2100 (Thomas et al., in 
press).  
Physical impacts 
Hydrological, ecological and morphological 
impacts of SLC, including:  
• Hydrological change including saltwater 
intrusion and flood inundation (coastal 
and/or fluvial).  With sea-level rise, the 
return period for a given coastal flood 
level is reduced. Climate change may lead 
to increased heavy precipitation events, 
exacerbating the risks of fluvial flooding. 
• Morphological change including erosion 
and changes in intertidal environments.  
• Ecological change including habitat loss. 
Coastal squeeze is a particular threat. This 
is where coastal habitats are trapped 
between a rising sea and a fixed landward 
boundary such as a flood defence, and are 
thus reduced in quantity or quality.  
Impacts may be slow e.g. through gradual 
erosion of salt marsh by ‘average ’ sea 
conditions, or more sudden through event-
driven changes like storm-induced flooding. 
Socio-economic impacts 
Impacts of SLC on people by means 
of social, built environment and 
ecological changes. Including:  
• Impacts on personal and 
community wellbeing including 
homes and property damage, 
health impacts, displacement, 
disruption to services, blight 
(disinvestment and out-migration) 
and impacts on insurance cost/ 
availabilit y.  
• Disruption/damage to 
infrastructure, of which there are 
significant assets around the 
Estuary including ports, power 
stations and transport networks.  
• Impacts on business and industry 
e.g. through disruption to supply 
chains, or by rendering customers, 
employees or suppliers unable to 
travel. Such impacts are unlikely to 
be limited to the local area.  
Vulnerability 
SLC impacts depend on factors including: 
• Exposure to the threat, including population distribution. 
• Sensitivity to change due to factors including age and income. 
• Mitigation measures (reducing carbon emissions to limit climate change), 
geoengineering responses (la rge scale interventions in the Earth ’s climate system), 
and adaptation measures.  Adaptation includes hard structures such as sea defences, 
and ‘softe r’ approaches like managed realignment, where an area not previously 
exposed to flooding is allowed to flood through the removal of defence structures. 
Fig. 3. Overview of expert model summarising SLC on the Severn Estuary.
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Fig. 4 summarises public understandings of each part of the
expert model – SLC drivers, rates, impacts and vulnerabilities – to
enable comparisons with the expert perceptions summarised in
Fig. 3 (see Appendix C for full results). As well as these ‘knowledge’
aspects, the public model consists of other factors such as concern,
responsibility and trust, which are elucidated here before we
compare the two models in Section 5. The ﬁrst aspect relates to
concern, levels of which varied amongst survey and interview
participants. Their comments ranged from Darren’s ‘[SLC] wouldn’t
be the end of the world’ and Owain’s ‘neither here nor there’, to
Henry stating that he feels ‘passionate’ about the issues. Christine
was unsure if sea levels were rising or falling, but stated that ‘if sea
levels were deﬁnitely rising, like if they rose an inch last year and
were forecast to rise another inch this year, I suppose we might
think about selling our house’. Indeed, the subject of SLC evoked
negative feelings amongst interviewees, who particularly
expressed fear of ﬂooding. Karen remembered driving through
ﬂoodwaters during the 2007 Gloucester ﬂood, and said, ‘that was
quite horriﬁc really [. . .] I was so frightened’. Betty expressed
similar feelings, stating that ‘it’s a terrifying thing, water, when it
does that’. Despite these emotions, SLC is not something that
individuals tend to think about much, and it did not factor highly
amongst interviewees’ concerns when compared with other issues.
Ruby for instance noted that there are levels of concerns about
things, and that her main concerns are more society-based.
Similarly, when asked how SLC compares in importance to other
issues that might concern him today, Anthony answered ‘not even
the slightest, to be honest with you’. However, when compared
with issues that may affect the Severn Estuary in particular, surveyrespondents rated SLC highly, above the local economy and local
society/community issues.
Interview participants tended to view SLC as something that
would affect other people and places worse than it would affect
their local area. Although a few stated that ‘SLC would affect
everyone’ (Steve) and ‘be no respecter of age, disability or how nice
they are’ (Ellen), interviewees tended to think that it would
particularly affect other countries such as Thailand, The Maldives,
and Bangladesh. Closer to home, participants talked about SLC as a
risk to other places in the UK, particularly the East Coast and
London, as well as places around the Severn Estuary; but rarely
where the interviewee lived. There was also a widespread belief
among interview participants that the impacts would be felt by
future generations, rather than themselves. For example, Christine
(age 69) stated that ‘I don’t think it’ll happen in my lifetime’, Karen
(age 48) that ‘I won’t be around by the time it rises to a serious
level’, and Jessica (age 36) that ‘it seems as though it’s something
that might happen to somebody in the future’. Despite this, some
residents voiced concerns about the impacts on future generations,
stating that ‘I do worry about the future’ (Ruby), and ‘we have to do
the right thing by our kids’ (Betty). To some extent, survey
responses were contrary to these interview ﬁndings, because more
respondents felt that SLC would affect the Severn Estuary than the
rest of the world.
Some interview participants actively engage with mitigating
SLC, for example by saving energy or using solar panels. As
landowners bordering the Estuary, two participants were heavily
involved in adaptation through surrendering their land for
managed realignment, although they were opposed to the scale
and nature of these measures. Despite a level of engagement
however, some interviewees responded with optimism or avoiding
Drivers and projections of SLR 
• 87% believe sea levels will rise by 2050, and 89% believe they will 
rise by 2100 and 2200. There is uncertainty regarding the  rates  of 
rise. Darren stated he ‘wouldn’t have a clue’, and Paul ‘could pluck 
three feet out of the air or 30 feet’.  
• 75% think melting land-based ice causes sea-level rise. Climate 
change and ‘ice melt’ were each mentioned by most interviewees 
unprompted, although Glenda inferred that because glaciers are 
‘relatively small’, sea-level rise ‘wouldn’t be more than an inch or 
so’. Fewer (49%) think climate change causes sea-level rise through 
thermal expansion, and only 22% agree that isostacy is causing 
local sea-level rise, a low salience echoed by interviewees  
• 68% think storms and su rges cause short term SLC, and more than 
half of interviewees mentioned tides and storms unprompted.  
• Half of interviewees talked about concurrent events, e.g. Steve 
stated ‘whereas it might be only once or twice a year when you get 
a very high tide and there ’s risk of it coming over [...] there ’s going 
to be more tides which will fall into the category in 100 years if 
you’re two foot higher or a foot higher. If you get a bit of wind 
behind it, obviously you increase the risk of it coming ove r.’  
Physical impacts
• 79% believe sea-level rise is an 
overall risk to the Estuar y. 
• Flooding was discussed by all 
interviewees.  
• Most think sea-level rise will 
cause increased shoreline 
erosion (81%), coastal flooding 
(79%), storm water drainage 
problems (76%), ecological 
change (74%) and coastal 
squeeze (72%). 57% think it 
will cause freshwater 
contamination.  
Socio-economic impacts 
• Home and property 
damage and impacts on 
infrastructure were 
mentioned by most 
interviewees without 
prompting.  
• Most think sea-level rise 
causes di fficulties getting 
home insurance (83%), 
loss/damage to private 
property (81%), travel 
disruption (76%) and 
emotional impacts (72%). 
Vulnerability
• 46% respondents think renewable technologies are one of the 
most effective mitigation measures for sea-level rise. Personal 
lifestyle changes ranked lower (20%) than geoengineering and 
reducing/limiting population growth (both 23%).  
• 53% think more/improved flood defences are one of the most 
effective adaptation measures for sea-level rise, a high salience 
echoed by interviewees. Also deemed e ffective were flood 
warnings (46%) and a barrage (43%). Fewer chose personal 
flood defences (26%) and home flood insurance (6%). 
• Interview participants drew on extensive personal experience e.g. 
being flooded, seeing the Severn bore and sailing in strong tides.  
• Interview and survey participants expressed varying levels of 
concern. 51% of survey respondents were fairly/very concerned 
about SLC on the Estuar y, 49% were not at all/not very 
concerned. For interviewees, SLC was of low concern when 
compared with other issues (e.g. econom y, local nuclear power, 
family and a Severn barrage). But when compared with issues 
that may affect the Severn Estuary in particula r, 41% of survey 
respondents chose SLC as a main issue, below flooding and 
renewable energy proposals (58% and 51%), level with pollution, 
and above transport and local economy (34% and 28%).  
• SLC evoked negative feelings  amongst interviewees, who 
described it as something that ‘fills me with horro r’ (Betty). 
• 19% chose options closer to ‘I think about SLC a lot’, while 48% 
chose options closer to ‘I never think about SLC’. Lee said, ‘I 
don’t really think about SLC too much. […]  What I don ’t see 
doesn’t hurt me’.  
• Sea-level rise is not highly  salient. When asked ‘what comes to mind 
when I say “Severn Estuary”?’ none talked about sea-level rise, but 
tides and the Severn bore were mentioned, along with mud, bridges, 
a barrage, and sailing.  When asked what the main issues facing the 
Estuary were, one participant said sea-level rise. Others mentioned 
flooding, global warming, ‘a huge wave’, erosion, and managed 
realignment, all of which are linked to SLC. 
• When ‘SLC ’ was raised, all interviewees were aware of the idea of 
long term changes in the level of the sea, and four mentioned shorter 
term changes by way of tides and the bore.  Some felt uninformed, 
stating that ‘I don’t really know about any of [the issues] ’ (Yasmine). 
Just 15% of survey respondents felt well informed about SLC.  
• SLC is seen by many as a distant risk. Interviewees tended to view it as 
something that would a ffect other people and places worse than it would 
affect their localit y. Howeve r, more survey respondents thought SLC will 
affect the Estuary (64%) than thought it will a ffect the rest of the world 
(50%). Few thought it will affect them personally (25%). Similar 
proportions think SLC will affect them in the future (30%) and now (28%). 
• Only 12% and 13% of survey respondents felt personally able to do much 
about the causes, and impacts, of SLC.  This low  self-efficacy was to some 
extent accompanied by placing the responsibility for responding with 
others. While 37% and 32% of survey respondents thought that it is their 
personal responsibility to act to reduce the causes, and impacts, of SLC 
(fewer thought it was not), a higher percentage (61%) thought it is the 
government’s responsibility to protect residents from flooding.  
• Only 7% of individuals feel well protected by flood defences, and there is 
conditional trust for the agencies involved.  
• Individuals blame a number of actors for the causes of SLC.  
• Some interviewees actively engage with SLC (e.g. through  
managed realignment); others respond with optimism /  avoidance. 
• 6% think sea-levels will fall by 2050. Christine stated that ‘it could 
be rising, it could be falling’, and  Yasmine reasoned that because 
the levels around the Estuary are sometimes referred to as 
‘moors’ (which tend to be high up), sea-level must be falling.  
• 49% think ozone layer thinning causes sea-level rise. 
• 69% think most global sea-level rise is caused by melting  sea-ice.
• 8% think sea-level rise poses an 
overall benefit. Interviewees 
suggested benefits could 
include habitat expansion, 
improved agricultural fertility 
due to flooding, increased 
viability of shipping, and 
greater power generation from a 
tidal barrage. 
• 60% of survey respondents 
believe the impacts of SLC will 
be gradual rather than sudden. 
• 12% chose recycling as one of the most e ffective mitigation 
strategies for sea-level rise. 
• Few interviewees 
mentioned impacts on 
health and services and 
inconvenience (e.g. 
travel disruption).  
• 37% think sea-level rise 
may cause increased 
capability for shipping 
and ports. Some 
interviewees reasoned 
that deeper water would 
benefit ships. 
Fig. 4. Summary public mental model of SLC on the Severn Estuary. Themes that are inconsistent with the expert model are summarised in grey dashed boxes. Non-knowledge
factors are shown in open dashed boxes. Question wording has been truncated (see Appendix B for full wording). All percentages refer to survey results.
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[global warming is] going to be cancelled out by the next little ice
age. Possibility, maybe. Trying to think positively’, while Lynne
said, ‘I don’t see it being a big permanent rise, not really. I have to
say. I’m probably a bit [of a] half full person really’. Someinterviewees also talked about trying not to think about the issues
because they ﬁnd them depressing, frightening or too big to deal
with. Ruby for instance said ‘I deliberately didn’t watch [the ﬁlm
‘An Inconvenient Truth’] because I do ﬁnd this kind of stuff quite
frightening. It makes you feel powerless as well’.
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and interview participants, who felt that ‘there’s not a lot we can do
about [the sea level rising]’ (Lee) or ‘certainly nothing I can do
personally’ (Fred). Amongst interviewees, low self-efﬁcacy was
accompanied by placing the responsibility for SLC with others.
While nature could not be blamed because ‘when the sea comes to
get you it doesn’t mean anything by it’ (Ellen), interview
participants laid the blame with a variety of actors including
corporations, rich people, ignorant people, government, and other
countries. Contrary to impressions from interviewees however,
more survey respondents thought that it was their responsibility to
reduce the causes and impacts of SLC than thought it was not.
However, interviewees and most survey respondents felt that it is
the government’s responsibility to protect residents from ﬂooding.
Ruby for example thought that the government would ‘somehow
protect us’, and Lynne believed they would have their ‘contingency
plans’.
Although participants transferred the responsibility for ﬂood-
ing to others, the relevant agencies are not fully trusted to carry out
their responsibilities effectively, and a number of interview
respondents expressed exasperation with the government and
the Environment Agency over ﬂood management. For example,
Lynne stated that ‘I can’t believe that no one’s working on a
solution. But they probably aren’t. But, you know, at the end of the
day, they’re telling people to get in a supply of sand bags. Well I’m
sorry, that was pre ﬁrst war. [. . .] It’s just ridiculous really’. Terry,
who is personally involved in surrendering his land for managed
retreat, said that the process is an ‘absolute disgrace, it is abysmal
what they’ve done over there’. Fred felt that individuals are treated
unfairly, and provided an example of building a garage: ‘we were
initially refused planning permission, because they complained,
said we were consuming the ﬂoodplain. [. . .] well what was
interesting was when it comes to build a new nuclear power
station, three buildings of six reactors, the fact that that will
consume 100 acres of ﬂoodplain doesn’t matter. Hence come back
to my point about there’s rules for us little people, but when it
comes to big businesses like that, ‘‘oh no this is judged by different
criteria’’’.
5. Discussion
5.1. Comparing expert and public perceptions
In this section, we compare each aspect of public SLC
understandings with the relevant part of the expert model. We
ﬁnd that, despite the public not feeling well informed about SLC,
many aspects of their mental models align with expert under-
standings. Regarding the drivers and rates of SLC, most
participants think that sea levels will rise, and half of interview
respondents recognised the signiﬁcance of combined events such
as a storm surge at high tide. There is much uncertainty about the
rates of future sea-level rise, which is consistent with the expert
model, and is unsurprising considering the complexity of the
issue and an increased range of projections in recent media
coverage (Rick et al., 2011). As would be expected in mental
models research, some aspects of the expert model are more
salient (i.e. prominent or important) amongst the public than
others. Ice-melt is salient, although there is some confusion over
which ice is more important. Whilst land-based ice melt is one of
the two dominant drivers of long-term mean sea-level rise in the
expert model (the other being thermal expansion), most survey
participants thought that it is mainly caused by melting icebergs/
sea-ice. While this highlights a difference between public and
expert mental models about the main causes of sea-level rise, it
may indicate that participants link it with melting ice per se
rather than the speciﬁcs. Indeed, most survey respondents alsoagree with the expert model that melting land-based ice causes
global sea-level rise. This ﬁnding is perhaps not surprising
considering it is a very speciﬁc aspect of the science, which could
be easily confused by communicators and the public. More
interesting and signiﬁcant perhaps is the ﬁnding that there is a
lower awareness of thermal expansion of ocean-surface water
(also noted by Read et al., 1994; Lorenzoni et al., 2006; Reynolds
et al., 2010; Tobler et al., 2012), and of the role of local subsidence
in raising relative sea levels. All of these factors are important
because they may affect individuals’ risk assessments, as
exempliﬁed by Glenda, who having seen glaciers melting in
Norway and not having heard of thermal expansion, inferred that
because glaciers are ‘relatively small’, sea-level rise ‘wouldn’t be
more than an inch or so’.
Public understandings of the physical impacts of SLC are also
broadly consistent with expert understandings, with most survey
respondents believing sea-level rise will be an overall risk to the
Estuary and posing threats of erosion, ﬂooding and ecological
change. Regarding socio-economic impacts, damage to homes and
property was of high salience amongst interviewees, and most
survey participants also think that rises in sea level will lead to
difﬁculties obtaining home insurance, travel disruption and
emotional impacts. Interviewees rarely mentioned knock-on
impacts such as inconvenience. This may be because people are
more likely to think about impacts that directly concern them, and
echoes previous research showing that public knowledge of
climate change consequences tends to focus on immediate
physical impacts such as ﬂooding rather than more indirect
impacts such as social disruption (Lorenzoni et al., 2006; Capstick
et al., 2013).
Regarding what can be done to mitigate or adapt to SLC, there
was generally good alignment between public and expert models.
Renewable technologies were perceived by a large proportion to be
an effective mitigation measure, a view consistent with the expert
model (notwithstanding substantial time lags and committed rise)
and with previous research (Parkhill et al., 2013). The ﬁnding that
12% of respondents rank recycling amongst the top three most
effective mitigation measures is inconsistent with the expert
model, and also echoes previous research (e.g. Read et al., 1994,
Lowe et al., 2006) showing that recycling is consistently cited as a
key climate mitigation measure, even though other responses are
deemed much more effective.
5.2. Other factors contributing to public mental models of SLC
A key contribution of this study is to illuminate other factors, in
addition to knowledge, that contribute to public mental models of
SLC. As shown in Fig. 4, these include levels of concern, perceptions
of self-efﬁcacy and responsibility, trust and ways of actively
engaging with or avoiding the issue. We found that such responses
vary widely. This may in part be because the public does not feel
well informed, and so do not have clearly deﬁned responses to it.
Despite large variation however, some patterns emerge. Firstly, the
issue is not highly salient, in line with research that shows climate
change has low salience due to its complexity and distance in space
and time (e.g. Lorenzoni and Pidgeon, 2006; Spence et al., 2012;
Parkhill et al., 2013). Individuals do not tend to think about it much,
and among interviewees at least, concern is low compared to other
issues such as the economy. These ﬁndings echo research that
shows climate change per se similarly receives a low priority
compared to day-to-day issues, particularly personal economic
security (Lorenzoni et al., 2007; Zsamboky et al., 2011). Compared
to speciﬁc issues facing the Severn Estuary however, SLC ranks
highly, and ﬂooding is a particular concern. Indeed, ﬂooding was
the most salient theme in the public model, which is consistent
with the high importance assigned to it by experts, and would be
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of ﬂooding on the Estuary (e.g. Marx et al., 2007).
One reason that many participants express low concern
about SLC may be that although most believe SLC will affect the
Estuary, in general people see it as something that will happen
to other people, in the future. It is a nuanced picture however,
and our ﬁndings resonate with research that shows climate
change is perceived as ‘being both distant and local in nature’
(Spence et al., 2012, 970). Indeed, the psychological distancing
of SLC can be interpreted in a variety of ways. First, as a rational
evaluation of the evidence. Interview and survey participants
tended to think that SLC would affect the rest of the world
more than it will affect them personally, and this is valid if we
assume the ‘rest of the world’ means low-lying developing
countries (as indicated by interviewees), which will likely be
affected more than the Severn Estuary (Nicholls and Cazenave,
2010). And while interviewees widely talked about SLC
predominantly affecting future generations, this is also likely
to be true when we consider time lags and increasing rates of
rise (IPCC, 2014). Second, it can be interpreted in the context of
the availability heuristic (Tversky and Kahneman, 1973). Ruby
(from Penarth) for instance thought Gloucester was vulnerable
to SLC, linking it to recent events there that she easily recalled:
‘I mean there was the huge ﬂood wasn’t there? A few years ago,
Gloucester way’.
While a third explanation for psychological distance could be
denial and dissociation from personal involvement (Lorenzoni
and Pidgeon, 2006), our results show that a signiﬁcant proportion
of survey participants perceive that the causes and impacts of SLC
are their responsibility. This is counter to research that shows a
transferral of responsibility in relation to sea-level rise (Harvatt
et al., 2011), and climate change more generally (Poortinga et al.,
2006; Spence et al., 2010; Pidgeon, 2012; Capstick et al., 2013).
The situation is not straight forward however, and a larger
proportion think that it is the government’s responsibility to
respond to the associated risk of ﬂooding, indicating that at least
some of the responsibility is transferred to others. Interviewees
expressed similar views, and consistent with previous literature
(Kreibich et al., 2009; Harvatt et al., 2011), survey respondents
focused more on mitigation and adaptation measures that are the
responsibility of the government (e.g. dredging and geoengineer-
ing) rather than the individual (e.g. personal lifestyle changes).
The relatively high importance assigned to geoengineering and
reducing or limiting population growth (Fig. 4) are interesting
considering that these are perhaps the most ‘extreme’ measures,
but may have been viewed as options that require little or no
personal day-to-day sacriﬁce. This responsibility transferral was
accompanied by a distrust in the agencies perceived to be
responsible. Participants did not tend to feel well protected by
ﬂood defences, and expressed exasperation with how SLC was
being dealt with. Our results therefore suggest that the public has
a ‘critical trust’ in these agencies (Poortinga and Pidgeon, 2003b;
Walls et al., 2004), whereby they do not distrust them outright
(they expect them to deal with the issues), but do not uncritically
accept their decisions either; instead viewing them with a degree
of scepticism.
The ﬁnding that people respond to SLC with optimism or
avoidance is no surprise when we consider reactions to climate
change and other risks (e.g. Norgaard, 2006; Bickerstaff and
Simmons, 2009), but both have been noted as potential barriers
towards climate change engagement (Lorenzoni et al., 2007;
Gifford, 2011). While these responses may provide ways of coping
with SLC, they are ‘maladaptive’ because they do nothing to
prevent negative impacts, and may even make them worse, for
instance by encouraging building on ﬂoodplains (Grothmann and
Patt, 2005).5.3. Implications
The public do not feel well informed about SLC, and there are
some important differences between public and expert percep-
tions, indicating that improved communications are necessary. The
complexity of the expert model means that communications will
not be straightforward, and must be selective and carefully
designed. They must focus on key messages so as to not waste the
public’s time and effort (Wynne, 1991) or divert their attention
from the most important aspects (Morgan et al., 2002), such as
effective adaptation measures. Our ﬁndings points to ways in
which this might be done.
Although the majority of participants thought that sea levels are
rising on the Severn Estuary, some thought that they are falling,
and many were unsure about how much long term change is
expected in future. Communications should therefore feature
estimates of future sea-level rise in the region. Without such
estimates, residents are unable to make informed decisions, such
as considering moving if sea levels are rising by more than an
acceptable amount (Christine). In order to be most salient in
decision-making, these might best be communicated when long-
term choices are being made, such as buying or renovating a home,
or in the context of debates about local planning or development
(e.g. house-building, ﬂood defences, renewable schemes). In this
respect, communications would not only be timely, but also link to
issues that are of greatest concern to residents. Considering
visualisation is one of the most powerful ways of making climate
change meaningful (O’Neill and Smith, 2014), projections could be
communicated using ﬂood depth maps that graphically show the
impacts of combined sea-level rise/extreme water level scenarios
(cf. Poumade`re et al., 2008; Purvis et al., 2008).
Other inconsistencies between public and expert mental
models should also be addressed through relevant public
communications and within the context of formal education.
Many lay participants believe that most global sea-level rise is
caused by melting icebergs/sea-ice, and while there is under-
standing that melting land-based ice causes sea-level rise, many
do not understand the roles of thermal expansion and isostatic
subsidence; perceptions that have implications for how risks are
interpreted. Another factor that should be communicated is the
concept of combined events, because those who do not
understand that rising sea levels exacerbate the effects of
extreme levels (e.g. tides, waves, surges) may underestimate the
risks. Related to this, communications should draw attention to
the potential for abrupt change resulting from these combined
events, because those who believe that the impacts of SLC will be
gradual may be less prepared for surprises such as storm surges,
which have in the past caused extensive loss of life on the
Estuary.
Providing information about the risks of SLC may be one step
towards increased public engagement. However, in line with
previous research (Cox et al., 2003, 2005), we show that public
mental models contain many factors in addition to knowledge.
These are important, because some may act as barriers to
engagement. Individuals who are unconcerned about SLC and
see it as a distant threat may be less likely to respond to
information about it; those who express low self-efﬁcacy may feel
that engagement is futile (Sims and Baumann, 1972; Breakwell,
2007; Lorenzoni et al., 2007); and optimistic individuals may
perceive mitigation/adaptation as unnecessary. Risk communica-
tions should therefore make the issue relevant to the here and now,
and include information about the most effective actions that
individuals can take (Bubeck et al., 2012; Pidgeon, 2010). A further
option would be to target communications towards segmented
audiences (Hine et al., 2014); for example according to whether
they are engaged, avoidant, optimistic or concerned.
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An underlying difﬁcultly of mental models research is that a
deﬁnitive model of ‘true risk’ cannot necessarily be constructed
(Rosa, 2003). The terms ‘misunderstandings’ (Cox et al., 2003),
‘misinterpretations’ (Cox et al., 2005) ‘misconceptions’ (Morgan
et al., 2002), ‘misperceptions’ (Austin and Fischhoff, 2011; Lata
and Nunn, 2011) and ‘incorrect beliefs’ (Read et al., 1994;
Morgan et al., 2002; Reynolds et al., 2010) are common in mental
models literature, and imply that the expert model is deﬁni-
tively correct or true, while the public model is not. This is of
course not necessarily the case (see for example Kuhn, 1962;
Edge, 1995). Though an expert model is a very useful tool in
exploring public perceptions, as it proved to be here, an
appraisal of local and tacit knowledges and how these inform
day-to-day and long-term decision-making would be a valuable
extension to the research.
The expert model is a snapshot of understanding, so might
change if different experts were interviewed or different
literature consulted, at a different time. The same applies to
the public respondents; surveying a different group of people
may have offered different  insights. Here, the interview and
survey samples overrepresented participants with higher edu-
cation levels. The researcher too is not a passive arbiter, and the
diagram summarising the expert model inevitably bears some
imprint of the researchers who produce it (Lowe and Lorenzoni,
2007). In our case, we approached the issue with prior
assumptions that SLC is a cause for concern on the Estuary,
alongside ﬁrst-hand experience of living in and having studied
the region for some years.
Finally, the ways in which models are elicited, recorded and
analysed can all affect research outcomes. The use of the term
‘sea-level change’ as opposed to the more usual ‘sea-level rise’
may have inﬂuenced results. Indeed, survey respondents felt less
informed about SLC than participants felt about sea-level rise per
se in the CLAMER study (2011); which may have been due to the
positioning of the question after ‘knowledge’ type questions in
the current survey, or it may have been due to some confusion
over the use of the term ‘SLC’. However, responses to the term
during interviews indicated that it was not confusing: all
interviewees talked about long term change, and some talked
about short-term change in addition. Indeed, likely due to the
use of this term, some respondents expressed the belief that sea
levels might fall, yielding a valuable insight for future commu-
nications.
6. Conclusions
This study has shown the merits of utilising a mental models
approach to gain a deeper, more holistic understanding of public
perceptions of SLC, and has provided insights for how risks might
best be communicated in future. While concentrating on the
Severn Estuary facilitated an in-depth assessment of a speciﬁc area,
a case-study focus limits our potential to contribute to discussions
of SLC perceptions more widely. Thus, the study should be
replicated in other, different at-risk areas. Furthermore, addressing
the barriers to engagement that we have outlined may not be the
end of the story. There are currently many institutional obstacles to
engagement, such as a lack of enabling initiatives (Lorenzoni et al.,
2007), planning legislation (Barnett et al., 2013) and coastal-
defence spending cuts (Zsamboky et al., 2011); which public
communication campaigns cannot address. Improved commu-
nications must therefore be accompanied by initiatives that enable
residents to respond to risks in appropriate ways, and by timely
and effective coastal management that is understood and trusted
by those it is designed to serve.Acknowledgements
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